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1 Introduction
There has been growing interest on the implications of incomplete markets
for both theoretical and empirical questions. Especially, many puzzles in the
economics and finance literatures have motivated the development and appli-
cation of the theory on portfolio choice with background risk with successful
results.
More precisely, the development of portfolio choice theory with incom-
plete markets has forced researchers to take into account the statistical prop-
erties of the uninsurable component of individuals’ income risk in explaining
the demand for risky assets. Because it is beyond the individual’s control,
this income risk has been termed ’exogenous’ or ’background’ risk. Consider-
ing diﬀerent classes of risks, Pratt and Zeckhauser (1987) with ’properness’,
Kimball (1993) with ’standardness’ and Gollier and Pratt (1996) with ’vul-
nerability’, establish conditions on individuals preferences for substitutability
between endogenous and exogenous risks. In these contexts, an investor will
reduce his demand for risky assets if the risk on his income increases.
There are very recent empirical papers which study the impact of income
uncertainty and precautionary motives on the structure of households’ port-
folio. But these papers do not lead to the same conclusions. On Italian data,
households facing uninsurable risk and future liquidity constraints will reduce
their share of risky assets (Guiso et al., 1996) and increase coverage against
the risks that can be avoided (Guiso and Jappelli, 1998). Vissing-Jorgensen
(2002) also finds evidence that background risk reduces stock market partic-
ipation in the United States. Hochguertel (1998) results for the Netherlands
are inconclusive and those of Alessie et al. (2000) for the same country did
not find a significant eﬀect of income uncertainty on the demand for risky
assets. But Arrondel and Masson (1996) obtained a diﬀerent result with
French data: if households are more exposed to risk (proxied by occupation
sectors), they invest a greater proportion of their wealth in risky assets.1
These inconclusive empirical results forced us to carefully look at the
hypotheses under which theoretical models predicted risk substitution. Pre-
cisely, all the theoretical results were conditional on the independence be-
tween the two risks (capital and income), implying no correlation. However,
1Arrondel and Masson (2002) obtain a similar conclusion with data of ”Patrimoine
97” Insee survey used in this paper. More precisely, households whose head works in the
private sector invest ceteris paribus more often in risky assets than households who work
in the public sector, even when they have known unemployment episodes.
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recent but yet preliminary and incomplete research on this correlation shows
that this hypothesis needs not be true.
In this paper we present an extension of the static portfolio model with
undiversifiable income risk to take account of a non zero correlation. We
identify conditions on the correlation under which the investor will ratio-
nally respond by increasing his demand for risky assets to increased income
uncertainty. As well, less stringent conditions under which risk substitution
may obtain can be found conditional on the correlation. So, previous models
are a particular case of our hypothesis. Then, we tested the hypothesis of
risk substitution using recent data concerning risky investment behaviour in
France. We found that French households respond by increasing their stock
holdings in response to the increase in future earnings uncertainty. This
conclusion being in contradiction with findings in other countries, could be
explained by spatial diﬀerences in the correlation between risks as our first
part theoretical extension suggests.
The paper is organized as follows: in section 2, we provide the theoreti-
cal framework of portfolio choice under incomplete markets and present our
extension of the model with a correlated background risk. We also lay down
the main hypothesis to be tested. Section 3 presents salient data features
and describes the measure of risk aversion and the households’ subjective
perception of income risk measure. The empirical analysis uses the 1997 IN-
SEE Survey on Wealth (”Patrimoine 97”) which combines data on financial
assets with information on individual income risk assessments for a sample of
10,207 French households. In section 4, we examine portfolio choice to esti-
mate the impact of changes in background risk on portfolio demands .Section
5 concludes.
2 Theory
Not enough attention has been paid to the statistical properties of back-
ground risk both at the theoretical and empirical levels, particularly to the
statistical relationship between background risk and excess financial return
risk. However, from an empirical point of view, there are some exceptions.2
Heaton and Lucas (2000) perform a cross-sectional analysis of the subjec-
tive correlation between these two risks. When non-diversifiable income risk
2For a list of diﬀerent measures of the correlation between labor incomes and stock
returns, see Haliassos (2002).
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is decomposed in diﬀerent categories (wage, proprietary and housing) each
of them has a diﬀerent statistical correlation to financial returns risk: on
average, wage income and returns to housing are negatively correlated with
stock returns, whereas proprietary income is positively correlated.3
Davis and Willen (2000) perform an empirical study of the correlation
in the vein of Heaton and Lucas (2000) but using a diﬀerent decomposition
criterion. They identify occupation-level components of individual income
innovations, motivated by the results of Cocco et al. (2001) who found that
the correlation between labor income innovations and equity return innova-
tions rises with education. Their main conclusions coincide with those of
the previous work: cross-sectional heterogeneity helps to explain observed
heterogeneity in portfolio choice and the statistical properties of income in-
novations with respect to financial return innovations are conditional on these
heterogeneities.
Botazzi et al. (1996) study the correlation of fluctuations between human
capital innovations and innovations on the return of assets for a cross-section
of OECD countries. For instantaneous correlations, they find that wages and
profits move in opposite directions for most OECD countries. However they
do not find a robust sign for correlations between human and financial capital
innovations.
Motivated by these results, we extend the static model of portfolio choice
to include a small partially correlated background risk. We are able to show
that in the case of negative correlation between the labour income shocks
and the excess financial return shocks, introducing an additive background
risk to the standard portfolio choice problem would increase the proportion
of stocks held by households even if we allow for risk substitution on the
unhedgeable component of the background risk. Intuitively, the negative
correlation can be interpreted as an uncontrollable implicit liability in risky
assets that individuals tend to compensate by directly modifying their port-
folio risk exposure in the sense of increasing it. Thus, we allow for risk
substitution on the independent component of the background risk, but the
hedging eﬀect from the correlated component can dominate the substitution
eﬀect.
3But the subjective measure of the correlation depends on individuals’ characteristics
(see Heaton and Lucas, 2000).
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2.1 Portfolio Choice Models
In this section we review the standard static optimal portfolio composition
approximation model for small risks and its extension to the presence of an
independent small background risk. Then we review the theoretical condi-
tions on the class of preferences or in the class of background risks considered,
under which we observe substitution between risks. We extend the results
of this literature to the case of a partially dependent small background risk.
Finally we discuss how the sign and magnitude of the correlation conditions
the theoretical predictions of the literature of risk substitution.
2.1.1 Complete Markets
Consider the problem4 of an agent that considers how to invest his current
wealth w0 when there are only two assets available : a risky asset promising
to deliver tomorrow a random return er and a riskless asset promising the
delivery of a sure return r. The individual objective function is a continuous
diﬀerentiable representation of his preferences that admit an expected utility
form over final wealth wf . Denoting by α the amount of initial wealth that
is invested in the risky asset, by ez ≡ er− r the excess return of the risky asset
over the riskless asset, and by w ≡ w0(1+r) the final wealth had he invested
all his current wealth w0 in the riskless asset, we can write the solution α∗
to the individual optimization problem as :
α∗ ∈ arg max
α
Eu(w + αez) (1)
Define as V (α∗) = Eu(w + α∗ez) the value function of the agent evalu-
ated at its optimal portfolio choice. Following Gollier (2001) and under the
assumptions :
(i) The excess return risk ez is small and alternates in sign,
(ii) u(.) is diﬀerentiable,
(iii) Eez > 0,
(iv) lim
α→+∞
V 0(α) < 0 (5), and
4Throughout the paper we will borrow the standard notation that is used in the theory
of choice under uncertainty. An excellent recent book by Gollier (2001) from which we
borrow notation, surveys and clarifies old and recent developments on the theory of choice
under uncertainty and its applications.
5Which is equivalent to requiring
lim
t→−∞
u0(t)
lim
t→+∞
u0(t) >
R
0
zdF (z)R
0
zdF (z)
, or alternatively that either
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(v) The Taylor expansion is taken around k = 0 using the parametrizationez = kEez +eε : Eez > 0 and Eeε = 0,
we can approximate the solution of the standard portfolio problem in the
following way :
0 < α∗ ' Eez
σ2zAu(w)
< +∞
So that the individual invests a positively bounded amount of his total wealth
in the risky asset which is larger the larger the excess return it promises, and
smaller the higher the risk aversion or the higher the variance of it.6
2.1.2 Incomplete Markets
In this section we present the extension of the basic portfolio choice model
to the presence of an uninsurable component of individual income called
’background risk’.7
If we consider that the individual second period income is non-diversifiable
(labor market second period income, proprietary income, or illiquid housing
investments), independent of excess financial return risk and we denote it byey then the standard portfolio problem described above can be rewritten as :
bα ∈ arg max
α
Eu(w + αez + ey) (2)
As previously we can define the value function of the agent as W (bα) =
Eu(w+bαez+ey) when evaluated at his optimal choice bα. Under the (adequately
modified) assumptions that we used for the standard portfolio choice model,
we can approximate for small background and endogenous risks, the solution
to the previous problem as follows :
0 < bα ' −EezE{u0[w + ey]}
E{eε2u00[w + ey]} < +∞
Which deserves some remarks :
lim
t→−∞
u0(t) = +∞ or lim
t→+∞
u0(t) = 0 or boundedness above or below of the domain of the
utility function.
6This optimal risky assets demand is similar to those of Arrow (1965) for a static frame-
work and Merton (1971) for a multiperiod model under specific assumptions (additively
separable utility function across periods and lognormality of asset prices).
7The eﬀect of uninsurable and unavoidable earnings risk on consumption and portfolio
choice was first studied by Drèze and Modigliani (1972).
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(i) The denominator of this expression can be rewritten in the following
way :
E{eε2u00[w + ey]} = E{eε2}Eu00[w + ey] + cov[eε2, u00] : eε2 = (ez − Eez)2
So that E{eε2} = E {(ez −Eez)2} = σ2z.
Since we can show8 that if cov[eε2, u00] = 0, we find an analogous expression
to the approximate solution of the standard portfolio problem [1] where we
will replace the index of absolute risk aversion Au(w) for the felicity function
u(.), by an index of absolute risk aversion Av(w) for the felicity function
v(s) = Eu(s+ ey), as defined by Kihlstrom et al. (1981)9 :
bα ' Eez
σ2zAv(w)
So that the portfolio problem with background risk will be analogous to the
standard portfolio problem except for the change in preferences. Questions
on the magnitude or direction of the optimal portfolio composition change
when a small background risk is introduced can be explained by diﬀerences
in the absolute risk aversion parameter when the underlying utility function
changes from u(.) to v(.).10
(ii) Observe that if we do not restrict the two risks to be statistically
independent, it can happen that W 0(bα)|bα=0 ≥ 0 and thus bα ≥ 0 even if
Eez < 0. This is because now :
sign W 0(bα)|bα=0 = sign{Eez + cov[ez, u0]Eu0 }
8Observe that cov[f(eε), g(ey)] = E[f(eε)g(ey)] − E[f(eε)]E[g(ey)] where f(s) = s2, g(t) =
u00(w + t). From the independence between eε and ey we will have that E[f(eε)g(ey)] =
E[f(eε)]E[g(ey)] if :
(i) f : (Eε,Ξε) → R+ borel measurable and bounded, since ∀ε ∈ Eε, f(ε) ≥ 0 and
Max{f(ε), f(ε)} < +∞.
(ii) g : (Ey,Ξy) → R− borel measurable and bounded. Thus considering −g(t) =
−u00(w + t) > 0,∀t in a compact support bounds below the fuction −u00(w + t). It is
bounded above as well if we impose lim
t→+∞
−u0(t) = 0, which is a necessary condition to
obtain an interior solution to the portfolio problem.
(iii) We assume that both eε and ey are defined on the same probability space (Ω, A,P).
These three conditions are suﬃcient to guarantee the independence between (Borel
measurable) real functions of independent real random variables.
9It must be noted that the assumptions under which this approximation is true are the
same as for the standard portfolio problem, where we replace u(.) by the indirect utility
function v(.) of Kihlstrom et al. (1981).
10It is an application of the theorem of Arrow (1965) and Pratt (1964).
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Since given that u00(.) < 0, the cov[ez, u0] > 0 is equivalent to cov[ez, ey] < 0.
Meaning that if both risks are negatively correlated, it is rational for
a risk averse individual to invest in the risky asset even if it generates a
negative expected excess return, since the reason why he will invest in it is
the partial insurance it provides against the exogenous risk. And conversely
if cov[ez, u0] > 0 : it can be perfectly rational for the agent not to invest
in the risky asset even if it delivers a considerable positive expected excess
return over the risk-free asset. The reason now is that investing in the risky
asset increases considerably the global risk the individual suﬀers, through the
positive covariance between the two risks. Not to invest is a way of reducing
the global risk up to the level the individual wishes to be exposed optimally.
It is obvious to say from the expression above that if cov[ez, u0] = 0, then for
the individual to be rational to invest in the risky asset even in the presence
of background risk, the excess return must be positive just as in the standard
portfolio problem. Thus,
(iii) Replacing function v(.) by function u(.) in the standard portfolio
problem, we obtain parallel conditions at the boundary, necessary to the
existence of an interior solution for the portfolio problem with a small back-
ground risk.
Pratt and Zeckhauser (1987) were the first to capture the common wis-
dom intuition that individuals should react by reducing their risky invest-
ments whenever their income became riskier, and termed it ’risk substitutabil-
ity’. Risk substitutability seeks conditions on the class of background risks ey
and/or on the class of preferences u(.), under which the optimal investment
in risky assets when final wealth is partly non-diversifiable, bα, is smaller than
what the agent would optimally invest were this non-diversifiable component
absent, α∗ :
α∗ ∈ arg max
α
Eu(w + αez) > bα ∈ arg max
α
Eu(w + αez + ey)
According to our approximations of the optimal solutions in each of the two
cases, we observe that it would be suﬃcient for α∗ > bα to have Av(w) >
Au(w), for a small independent background risk ey. For background risks not
necessarily small, given the global concavity of the problem, the condition
for risk substitutability imposes a non-positive sign on the FOC of problem
[2] when evaluated at the optimal solution of problem [1]:
W 0(α∗) ≡ Ez,y{ezu0[w + α∗ez + ey]} ≤ 0
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Depending on the class of independent background risks under consideration,
the diﬀerent authors needed to impose diﬀerent restrictions on individuals’
preferences for risk substitution behaviour to be observed.
Pratt and Zeckhauser (1987) established that introducing an independent
background risk in the class of undesirable risks11, requires preferences to
be ’proper ’ in order to observe that the individual rationally reacts so as
to substitute the increased exposure to the exogenous risk by reducing his
exposure to the endogenous risk, i.e. decreasing his risky portfolio demand.
Kimball (1993) stated that if the felicity function of the individual sat-
isfies the decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) and decreasing absolute
prudence (DAP)12 restrictions, introducing an independent loss-aggravating
background risk13 ey to the standard portfolio problem (1) should decrease
the individual optimal holdings of the risky asset. Preferences satisfying the
DARA and DAP restrictions are termed ’standard’ by Kimball14. This result
is also true in a multi-period portfolio choice model.15
11A risk ey is undesirable at initial wealth w if and only if Eu(w + ey) ≤ u(w). This can
be restated in terms of the risk premium ρ : Eey ≤ ρ. This set of risks are also known as
expected-utility-decreasing risks. Intuitively, the agent is willing to pay more than their
expected value to take a decision as if he were in a certain environment (according to a
certain objective function).
12Kimball (1990) proposes to measure absolute prudence by the ratio p = −u000/u00.
Positive prudence implies precautionary saving and indicates the strength of precautionary
motive: if people have decreasing prudence, precautionary saving declines as individual
wealth rises. Intuitively, an individual behaves according to decreasing absolute prudence
if, as he becomes richer, he is willing to pay a decreasing amount to make his optimal
decision in the absence of uncertainty prevail under uncertainty.
13A risk ey is loss-aggravating when starting from initial wealth w if and only if it satisfies
Eu0(w + ey) ≥ u0(w). Observe that this is equivalent to Eey ≤ Ψ : Ψ is the precautionary
premium as defined by Kimball (1990). The set of risks that satisfy this property for
preferences u(.) and initial wealth w are called expected-marginal-utility-increasing risks.
In intuitive terms, they are risks that make the agent willing to pay a smaller amount
than its expected value in order to keep as optimal the decision prevailing before the
risk introduced. Finally observe that if preferences are DARA, every undesirable risk is
loss-aggravating.
14Kimball (1993) introduces also the concept of temperance (measured by the ratio
t = −u0000/u000) which describes a desire to reduce total exposure to risk. Under the
condition of ”standardness”, temperance is greater than prudence which is also greater
than absolute risk aversion under DARA (t > p > A).
15Some recent theoretical papers examine the joint consumption-portfolio choice prob-
lem in the presence of background risk. Using a two-period model, Elmendorf et Kimball
(2000) analyze the eﬀect of uninsured labor income risk on the joint saving/portfolio
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Finally Gollier and Pratt (1996)16 consider the most restrictive class of
independent background risks (unfair risks17) and obtain the least restric-
tive class of preferences under which the individual behaviour displays risk
substitutability. Gollier and Pratt show that preferences must satisfy the
condition of ’risk vulnerability’.18
Then observing that if preferences are DARA, every undesirable risk is
loss-aggravating, Gollier and Pratt (1996) summarize the relationship be-
tween the preference class restrictions as:
Standardness⇒ Properness⇒ Risk vulnerability⇒ DARA
2.2 A Correlated Small Background Risk
In this section we extend the basic portfolio problem to allow for a small
partially correlated background risk, borrowing from Elmendorf and Kim-
composition decision. Under ”standarness”, increase in background risk reduces demand
for risky securities. Increase in saving is observed at the same time under more stricter
conditions on preferences (under CRRA for example).
Koo (1995), extending Merton’s (1971) multi-period consumption-portfolio choice model
to labor income uncertainty and liquidity constraints, shows numerically that if economic
agents have constant relative risk aversion (CRRA), an increase in the variance of per-
manent income shocks leads to a reduction in both optimal allocation to stocks and the
consumption-labor income ratio.
More recently, Viceira (1999) considers a similar multi-period model for which he derives
an approximate analytical solution. He finds ”that an mean-preserving increase in the
variance of labor income growth reduces the investor’s willingness to hold the risky asset
and increases her willingness to save” (if investor’s preference are described by CRRA
instantaneous utility function and that labor income risk is independent of stock market
risk). Moreover, he shows that consumer primarily reacts by extending precautionary
saving and secondarily by reducing his risky portfolio (see also Campbell and Viceira,
2002, and Letendre and Smith, 2001).
16These two authors made two major contributions in this paper beyond its own original
scientific contribution. First, they synthesized and clarified the relation between previous
papers on restrictions on preferences that captured the intuitively appealing notion of ’risk
substitutability’. Second, they generalized them in the sense of extending their results to
the more intuitive class of unfair risks, evidentiating the trade-oﬀ between restricting the
class of preferences and restricting the class of background risks.
17A risk ey is unfair if and only if Eey ≤ 0. This can be restated in terms of the risk
premium ρ : Eey ≤ 0 ≤ ρ. Observe that undesirable risks have no a priori restriction on
the sign of their expectation, and thus include unfair risks as a particular class.
18Preferences are ’risk vulnerable’ if absolute risk aversion, A, is decreasing and convex.
This is equivalent to p > 2A.
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ball (2000) its stylized specification. The crucial point is that the sign and
magnitude of the correlation may exacerbate or counterbalance the opti-
mal portfolio response to the introduction of a background risk, even under
the assumptions on preferences or risks that guarantee risk substitutability
(except independence). Intuitively, if we suppose that there is a negative
correlation between the endogenous and the exogenous risk, introducing it
in the agent’s program would generate an additional motive for holding the
endogenous risk: insurance against the adverse realizations of the exogenous
risk.
2.2.1 A Partially Correlated Small Background Risk.
We want to study the individual static portfolio decision problem when the
two risks are statistically correlated. To do this we adopt the methodology of
Elmendorf and Kimball (2000) to the simpler problem defined above althoughey = y +e²+ βez = eh+ βez. So that allowing for β 6= 0 we allow for a non-zero
correlation between a part of the undiversifiable labour income risk ey−eh and
the endogenous financial excess return risk ez. The program (2) of the agent
is modified accordingly, to become:
bθ ∈ arg max
θ
Eu[w + θez + eh]
So that the optimal portfolio composition that satisfies the FOC which is
necessary and suﬃcient will be:
bθ = bα+ β
We are going to derive approximations of the solution for small correla-
tions β and risks ez,eh by using a first order Taylor expansion on the FOC.
We will use the indirect utility function of Kihlstrom et al. (1981) over the
independent component eh of background risk ey to rewrite program (2) as :
bθ ∈ arg max
θ
Ev[w + θez] (3)
So that the FOC evaluated at the optimum α∗ of program (1) becomes of an
indeterminate sign:
Ez{ezv0[w + α∗ez + βez]} Q 0
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Proposition 1 : If we introduce a small partially correlated background
risk into the standard portfolio problem, the optimal portfolio composition
response depends, under the standard assumptions for risk substitutability,
on the sign and magnitude of the small correlation between risks19.
Proof. Consider the FOC of the agent’s problem (3) and take a first order
Taylor expansion on the marginal indirect utility:
v0[w + αz + βz] = v0[w + αz] + (βz) v00[w + αz] + o(βz),∀z
Where o(βz) is a quantity that represents higher order terms of βz that will
tend to zero faster than βz as βz → 0. This approximation is then valid for
both β and z small. We obtain the following expression after premultiplying
by z both sides of the approximation, taking expectations and evaluating the
FOC approximation at the optimum of the standard portfolio problem (1):
Ez{ezv0[w + α∗ez + βez]} ≈ Ez{ezv0[w + α∗ez]}+ βEz{[ez]2 v00[w + α∗ez]}
≈ Ez,h{ezu0[w + α∗ez + eh]}+ βEz,h{[ez]2 u00[w + α∗ez + eh]}
Where the approximate equality follows from substituting the indirect utility
v(.) by its direct utility representation u(.). Then the first term on the RHS
corresponds to the eﬀect of introducing an independent background risk on
the optimal portfolio composition of the standard portfolio problem under
the assumption of independence between the endogenous and the exogenous
risk. But now, there is a second term the sign of which depends on the sign
of the correlation β :
β < 0 =⇒ Ez{ezv0[w + α∗ez + βez]} Q 0 =⇒ bθ Q α∗ (4)
β ≥ 0 =⇒ Ez{ezv0[w + α∗ez + βez]} ≤ 0 =⇒ bθ ≤ α∗
The importance of this proposition is to show that even if we impose
conditions on preferences and on the independent component of background
risks to observe risk substitution, we might not observe it if the correlation
19Te reader is referred to the appendix for a more intuitive and extensive interpretation
of the results of this proposition. There, the eﬀect of introducing a completely correlated
risk is developed to grasp the intuition of the methodology.
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with the dependent component of the background risk is negative and suf-
ficiently large. On the contrary, if both risks are positively correlated it is
possible that we observe risk substitution under less stringent conditions on
preferences or the class of background risks considered. Observe also that if
the correlation is null, there is no correlated component of the background
risk and the standard restrictions on preferences and background risks predict
when risk substitution is to be obtained. Finally observe that the proposition
does not deal with a proper ’increase in risk’20. Instead we have adopted the
more comfortable assumption of introducing an additive background risk as
it is standard in this type of literature.
2.2.2 A partially Negatively Correlated Background Risk.
Since we are interested in observing conditions under which individual agents
rationally react to the introduction of partially non-diversifiable income risk
by tilting up the fraction of initial wealth invested in stocks, we will just
consider the case of negative correlation in this section. As the approximate
solution (4) shows, in the case of positive correlation risk substitution is
aggravated.
Proposition 2 : A decreasing absolute risk averse individual will tend to
increase his optimal exposure to financial risks when a partially negatively
correlated risk is introduced additively into his optimization program, provided
the undiversifiable uncorrelated part of the exogenous risk is loss-aggravating.
Proof. The FOC of 2 is : Ez,h{ezu0[w+bθez+eh]} = 0⇐⇒ Ez{ezv0[w+bθez]} = 0
by definition of the indirect utility function v(x) = Ehu[x + eh], and by the
independence between ez and eh. The FOC of 1 is : Ezu0[w + α∗ez] = 0.
Subtracting both expressions : Ez
³ez{v0[w + bθez]− u0[w + α∗ez]}´ = 0. If for
any possible realization of the random variable z we have that v0[w + bθz]−
u0[w + α∗z] = 0, the necessary and suﬃcient condition will be satisfied.
If eh is loss-aggravating we have that Ehu0[w + eh] ≥ u0[w] or equivalently
that v0[w] ≥ u0[w]. Thus for the suﬃcient condition to be true, we need that
20A step towards this direction has been undertaken by Eeckhoudt et al. (1996) which
is an analysis that extends the previous literature to consider aﬃliated risks, a form of
positive dependence.
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w+bθz ≥ w+α∗z,∀z or equivalently that bθ ≥ α∗. Now since bθ ≡ bα+β : β < 0
we have that bα ≡ bθ − β > α∗
The intuition can be grasped in figure 1.
Figure 1: Intuition of the proof of Proposition 2
The main implication of this proposition is precisely to place ourselves
in the class of loss-aggravating risks to show that even if we would impose
conditions for preferences to be ’standard ’ in Kimball’s (1993) framework,
it would be possible that agents rationally increase their portfolio demands
if labor income risk is partially negatively correlated to risky assets excess
return.
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The following proposition extends the results of the first proposition on
the eﬀects of introducing a partially negatively correlated labor income risk
(background risk) to the class of loss aggravating risks in which initial wealth
is random.
Proposition 3 We can extend the previous proposition to the background
risk ey being in the class defined as :
Eu0(w + α∗ez + ey) ≥ Eu0(w + α∗ez) (5)
And the conclusion now will be that α∗ < α∗−β ≤ bα : β < 0. Thus the optimal
portfolio composition bα in the presence of the partially negatively correlated
background risk ey will be higher than in the absence of any exogenous risk,
and still bigger than the increase that would correspond to fully hedge the part
of labor income risk that can be diversified using the financial markets.
Proof. The FOC of (2) is : Ez,h{ezu0[w+bθez+eh]} = 0⇐⇒ Ez{ezv0[w+bθez]} =
0 by definition of the indirect utility function v(x) = Ehu[x+ eh], and by the
independence between ez and eh. The FOC of (1) is : Ezu0[w + α∗ez] = 0.
Subtracting both expressions : Ez
³ez{v0[w + bθez]− u0[w + α∗ez]}´ = 0. If for
any possible realization of the random variable z we have that
v0[w + bθz]− u0[w + α∗z] = 0 (6)
the necessary and suﬃcient condition will be satisfied. If ey is in the class of
loss-aggravating risks satisfying (5) we have that Ev0(w+θ∗ez) ≥ Eu0(w+α∗ez)
using the definition of the indirect utility function, with θ∗ ≡ α∗+β : β < 0.
A suﬃcient condition guaranteeing that ey is in the class (5) is, taking the
following definitions eω ≡ w + α∗ez,eε ≡ βez,
∀ω, ε : v0(ω + ε) ≥ u0(ω)
And particularly it must be true that :
∀ω : v0(ω +min ε) ≥ u0(ω)
Noting that we adopt the convention of sign min ε < 0 so that eε ≡ βez implies
that if β < 0 then min ε ≡ min[βz] = β[max z] < 0. Conversely, if β > 0
then min ε ≡ min[βz] = β[min z] < 0 given that ez is a random variable that
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Figure 2: Intuition of the proof of Proposition 3
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must alternate in sign for the portfolio problem to have a bounded solution.
This observation will be used below.
As depicted in figure 2, and using the fact that v00(.), u00(.) < 0 by risk
aversion, two situations are possible at any particular ω0:
Situation A is not possible since if u0(ω0 + min ε) > v0(ω0 + min ε) ≥
u0(ω0) then there must exist a ω1 < ω0 : v0(ω1) = u0(ω1) implying that
v0(ω1 +max ε) < u0(ω1) by v00(.) < 0. A contradiction. Then only situation
B is possible imposing that:
v0(ω0 +min ε) ≥ u0(ω0 +min ε),∀ω0, ε (7)
Now we will use condition [6] conveniently rewritten in terms of ω, ε as follows
for all possible values of z:
v0[w + bαz + βz + α∗z − α∗z] ≡ v0[ω + ε+ (bα− α∗)z] = u0[ω]
and plugging the last equality in the condition [7] :
v0(ω0 +min ε) ≥ v0
·
ω0 + [min ε] + [min ε] + (bα− α∗) 1
β
[min ε]
¸
By risk aversion, i.e. v00(.) < 0, the previous inequality implies that :
[min ε] + (bα− α∗) 1
β
[min ε] =
1
β
[min ε] [β + (bα− α∗)] = [max z] (bθ − α∗) ≥ 0
or that bθ−α∗ ≥ 0 since max z > 0 by convention. Therefore bα ≥ α∗−β > α∗
for β < 0.
We have showed that respecting the theories under which risk substitu-
tion appears, except for the independence of background risk, it is perfectly
rational for the individual to increase his optimal exposure to portfolio risk
when risks are partially negatively correlated. This increase can temper the
intuitive risk substitution eﬀect depending on the sign and magnitude of the
correlation. Furthermore, interpreting this finding from the point of view of
empirical predictions on the response of optimal investment in risky assets
to the introduction of an additive background risk, we can conclude that the
sign of the correlation must be taken into account to predict the direction
of the response. Without controlling for it, the empirical evidence cannot
pretend to be conclusive on risk substitutability.
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3 The Data and the Risk Variables
We mostly rely here on the ”Patrimoine 97” household survey and on a
specific part of the questionnaire devoted to the risk variable (either exposure
or attitudes).
3.1 The ”Patrimoine 97” French Household Survey
Anationally representative sample of more than 10,000 households was drawn
and a comprehensive interview survey of their wealth was conducted by the
INSEE. It is an abridged version of the questionnaire from the earlier survey
on ”Financial Assets 1992”. In particular it provides:
- detailed information on the socio-economic and demographic situation
of the household (education, occupational group, marital status, information
concerning the children...), as well as on the biographical and professional
evolutions of each spouse (youth, career, unemployment or other interrup-
tions of professional activity) ;
- detailed data on household’s income, on the amount and the composition
of its wealth (including liabilities and professional assets) ;
- brief information on the inter-generational transfers received and be-
queathed (financial helping out, gifts and inheritance) and more generally on
the ”history of its wealth”.
More specifically, a part of the questionnaire tries to give us a general idea
of individuals’ degree of exposure and aversion to risk, as subjectively per-
ceived and assessed by them. It consists of a recto-verso questionnaire which
was distributed to the interviewees at the end of the first interview. This page
submitted to the whole sample of 10,207 households must be filled in indi-
vidually by the interviewee and his/her spouse (if applicable) and returned
by post to INSEE. Only 4,633 individuals answered to this questionnaire
(corresponding to 2,954 households).
The content is slightly diﬀerent for employed persons than for unemployed
or non working persons. More specifically, it asks the former to assess their
short and long-term risks of unemployment, as well as the likely change in
their future income over the next 5 years. In addition, a simple two-stage
lottery game enables us to divide the individuals into four groups according
to their degree of relative risk aversion following the methodology of Barsky
et al. (1997).
Table 1 looks at the ownership of various forms of stocks as well as at
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the amounts invested in 1997. The fraction of households with direct stock-
holding is about 15 percent. More precisely, around 12 percent of households
have listed shares, 1.4 percent have non-listed shares and 3.1 percent own
employers’ shares. The proportion of households with indirect stockholding
-mainly through mutual funds- is around 13.5 percent. It follows that the
upper bound of (direct or indirect) stockownership in France is estimated to
be around 23 percent of the population. The average amount invested in
(direct) stocks is about 3,800 euros (25,000 euros among direct stockholders)
and households invest on average 6,700 euros in stocks or in mutual funds
(29,000 euros among owners).
A descriptive analysis (Arrondel and Masson, 2002) shows that stock-
holding exhibits a humped-shaped pattern according to age, with a peak
of 28 percent in the 50-59 age bracket and increases very sharply with the
level of (financial) wealth, concerning 85 percent of the households in the
top centile. Stockholders are better educated, more often self-employed or
employees in the private sector. Moreover, the frequency of stockownership
is higher for male-headed or two income recipient households, and also when
parents themselves own(ed) stocks.
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the whole sample of 10,207 house-
holds and for the sample of 2,954 respondents. There are only small dif-
ferences between the two samples: the respondents seem to be older and
more educated; they are more often white-collar workers and single and have
less children; they are a little more wealthy (+ 6.7 percent for net wealth,
+8.8% for financial wealth) and earn a little more money at work (+ 2.6
percent). A Logit model which estimates the diﬀerences between the two
samples confirms these descriptive eﬀects of wealth, social status, education
and household composition.
These diﬀerences in socio-economic characteristics explain why the sam-
ple of respondents own more often risky assets: the probability of owning
risky assets is higher among the respondents than in the total sample (+5.5
percentage points for direct stockholding and +7 percentage points for di-
rect or indirect stockholding). But the average proportion of financial wealth
invested in risky assets is similar.21
21But, for the moment, we used the sample of respondents without taking into account
this selection bias.
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3.2 Measuring Relative Risk Aversion
To obtain a measure of risk aversion, we asked individuals about their will-
ingness to gamble on lifetime income (see the appendix) according to the
methodology of Barsky et al. (1997). The ”game” resides in determining se-
quentially whether the interviewee would accept to give up his present income
and to accept other contracts, in the form of lotteries: he has one chance in
two to double his income, and one chance in two for it to be reduced by
one third (contract A), by one half (contract B), and by one fifth (contract
C). This allows us to obtain a range measure of relative risk aversion under
the assumption that preferences are strictly risk averse and utility is of the
CRRA type. The degree of relative risk aversion is less than 1 if the individ-
ual successively accepts contracts A and B ; between 1 and 2 if he accepts A
but refuses B ; between 2 and 3.76 if he refuses A but accepts C ; and finally
more than 3.76 if he refuses both A and C. Among the 4,633 respondents to
the questionnaire, 3,483 individuals participated in the lottery.
Table 2 gives the fraction of all respondents who fall into the four risk
aversion groups. The first line gives the frequencies among the whole sample
of respondents. The second line displays the frequencies among fifty-year-old
or more individuals. These results could be compared to those of Barsky et
al. (1997) and those of Kapteyn and Teppa (2002) among the same age group
(second and third line). As for the U.S. (76%) and the Netherlands (79.8%),
most of the French respondents (85.4 percent) are in the category of high
relative risk aversion (they refuse contract A). The main diﬀerence between
France and the two other countries resides in the distribution between those
who accept or refuse the contract C. In France, 57 percent of individuals who
rejected contract A refuse contract C and 43 percent accepted this contract.
However in the U.S. only 15 percent accept contract C and only 17 per cent
do so in the Netherlands. Moreover, in France, only 6 percent accept contract
B whereas in the U.S., as in the Netherlands, the acceptance rate is more
than twice this rate (12.8 percent in US and 11.2 in Netherlands). In the
U.S. and in the Netherlands there are more individuals with low relative risk
aversion (inferior to 1).
How does risk aversion change with consumer’s attributes? So, we have
regressed the measure of relative risk aversion (by an ordered Probit model)
on observable characteristics that can proxy for diﬀerences in tastes (Arrondel
et al., 2002). Few explanatory variables are statistically significant to explain
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risk aversion. You become more risk averse when you are older; a woman22;
when your parents had financial diﬃculties during your youth; when parents
do not hold risky assets; and when people are educated. Finally and like in
Barsky et al. (1997), we find that risk tolerance decreases with income until
the middle of the distribution, and then increases23.
We examine also the extent to which measured risk aversion predicts risky
behavior (Arrondel et al., 2002): propensity to take risk in financial decisions,
participation in horse-betting type of games (horses race bets, national lotter-
ies, slot machines, casino) and choice of occupational status (self-employed).
We find that the risk aversion measure predicts all these risky behaviors, even
after controlling for the economic and demographic variables: less risk averse
individuals are those who are more willing to take risk in financial decisions,
or to participate in national lotteries. Rather, doing racetrack bets or play-
ing with a slot machine are related to intermediate risk averse individuals.
Being self-employed (non farmer) is also influenced by CRRA: individuals
who choose contract A are more often self-employed than the others.
3.3 The Self-Reported Measure of Future Income Risk
To construct a proxy for the subjective variance of households’ income (see
the appendix), the methodology we followed is inspired in the survey car-
ried out by the Bank of Italy, ” Survey of Household Income and Wealth ”
(SHIW), for 1989 (Guiso et al., 1992). It asks households to distribute 100
points between diﬀerent scenarios regarding the evolution of income - We as-
sume that the household income variance can be proxied by the respondent’s
estimated variance or, when there were two respondents in the household,
by the head of the household variance evaluation24. So doing we obtain a
measure of income uncertainty for 2,334 households. The average expected
growth of future income is around 1.5%25.
22This gender-specific risk behaviour is also obtained by Barsky et al. (1997) but not
by Kaptein and Teppa (2002).
23The relationship between CRRA and wealth is ambiguous because the causality should
be the inverse (a more prudent consumer should save more). In Arrondel (2002), estimation
of wealth equations shows no relation between asset holdings and CRRA.
24Assume that five years ahead expected real income is yt+5 = yt(1+ x¯), the formula of
the expected variance of household income is var(yt+5) ≡ σ2y = σ2xy2t , where yt is current
real income, x¯ is the expected growth rate of real income and σ2x its variance.
25French time series on income give a mean growth of 1.8% over the period 1990-1996.
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Table 3 displays the frequency distribution of the ratio between the sub-
jective standard deviation and current income (σ/y). Two measures of risk
are calculated depending of the value hold for upper and lower bounds (re-
spectively 35 and 50%). More than forty percent of those surveyed hold point
expectations about five year ahead expected real income. For almost half of
them (46 percent) the standard error is between 0 and 10 percent (resp.
40%). Only 5 percent (resp. 8 percent) display a measure of uncertainty
exceeding 15 percent. For the whole sample, the mean of the standard error
of income shocks is about 4.3 percent (resp. 4.9) of the level of real income.
The subjective income variance reported by French households is strikingly
low when compared with the value usually assumed in the literature on pre-
cautionary saving, reporting a value of the standard error of income shocks
between 10 and 20 percent of the earnings’ level (for example 15 percent for
next year expected earnings in the U.S. as reported in Deaton (1992). In the
SHIW survey on 1989 Italian data, Guiso et al. (1992) obtain also a very low
earnings variance for next year expected income; the standard error of earn-
ings’ shocks being evaluated at 1.15 percent of current real earnings’ level.
These authors put forward several reasons to explain the gap between the
diﬀerent measures: the nature of the data (self reported measure of earnings
uncertainty and standard error of earnings uncertainty obtained from panel
data); the possibility that Americans face more earnings uncertainty than
Italians; overestimation of the true ”uncertainty” in econometric regressions
or measurement error in cross section data.
A Tobit regression26 of (σ/y) on the sample characteristics shows that
less risk averse households tend to report a higher variance. This result
confirms that attitude towards risk aﬀects job choice, with more risk averse
households choosing safer occupations. We show that self-employed (except
farmers) anticipate a higher income risk for the next five years. In other
respects, it confirms that old households report a lower variance than young
households corroborating that income profiles show decreasing risk along the
life cycle. Households whose head is currently unemployed anticipate a higher
risk on their future income like those who had or have health problems.
26The results of these regressions can be obtained from the authors upon request.
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4 Empirical Analysis of Portfolio Choice
In this section, we use data from survey ”Patrimoine 1997” to study the
impact of background risk and borrowing constraints on the demand for risky
assets in France. The current analysis compares closely to that of Guiso et al.
(1996) mainly in two respects: we assess income uncertainty from subjective
information and we dispose of a similar measure of borrowing constraints.
4.1 Econometric Specifications
We posit the following relation for the share of risky assets in financial wealth:
A
F
= g(σ2, cl, γ,X) + e (8)
where A ≥ 0 is the demand for risky assets and F is total financial
wealth. cl is the probability of being liquidity constrained in the future
(see the appendix), σ2 is the subjective earnings variance, γ is coeﬃcient
of relative risk aversion and X is a vector of variables which influence the
demand for risky investments. e is an error term. In specification (8) income
risk is assumed to be exogenous as in recent models of portfolio choice.
The set of explanatory variables X has been chosen according to the
theoretical models. In portfolio choice models where capital markets are
imperfect (transaction costs, holding costs, imperfect information) portfolios
are incomplete (King and Leape, 1998). So portfolio choice depends on
household’s income and wealth (to finance transaction and information costs)
and on the stock of financial information (proxied by age, education, parents’
wealth composition). We take into account other sources of future exogenous
risk, especially on family (we control only by marital status and number of
children at home or away from home). Finally, we introduce the nature of
(present or past) professional activity (employee vs. self-employed).
The eﬀect of age included in X is polysemous (Arrondel and Masson,
1996). Bodie et al. (1992) show that the young enjoy greater labor flexibility
than the old and may therefore be more likely to hold risky assets; Gollier
and Zeckhauser (1997) show that young households take on relatively more
portfolio risk than older households if (and only if) absolute risk tolerance is
convex; King and Leape (1987) stress that financial information is acquired
slowly along individual’s life, a fact that can explain why the young hold a
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less diversified portfolio than the old: the young are more likely to be liquidity
constrained and so less willing to take risk when choosing their portfolio.
A simple OLS regression of (8) leads to inconsistent estimates due to the
fact that a significant proportion of households does not own risky assets. In
the same way, OLS regressions of (8) on the restricted sample of investors who
hold risky assets is subject to selection bias (Heckman, 1976). So, I model
the demand for risky assets as a two-stage decision process (King and Leape,
1998) where the first step is a Probit model to account for the probability of
ownership and the second step consists in estimating conditional demand of
risky assets (by introducing the opposite of Mill’s ratio in the set of regressors
to correct selectivity bias). In other words, households choose first whether
or not to hold risky assets, then they decide how to allocate total financial
wealth between safe and risky securities. As there are only two categories of
assets used in regressions, it is also possible to handle the selection bias by
estimating a simple Tobit model on the share of risky assets where the lower
limit is zero. However, Tobit estimation constrains to depend on the same
set of variables, the determinants of whether to hold risky assets or not and
if so how much.
In the two-stages procedure, we use diﬀerent sets of explanatory variables
to explain the discrete and the continuous choice. We assume that informa-
tion costs explain essentially the decision to hold or not risky assets (Arrondel
and Masson, 1990). Therefore we introduce education and the presence of
risky assets in parents’ wealth only in the Probit model27. Moreover, this
hypothesis guarantees that the opposite of Mill’s ratio is not co-linear with
other explanatory variables of conditional demand.28
Tables 5 (a and b) and 6 (a and b) display results issued of the two
econometric techniques. Column 1 and 2 of the tables show results of two-
step estimation; column 3 displays results of Tobit estimation.
27Moreover, gains or loose in stock exchange investments have been introduced only in
the demand equation.
28For more details about estimation of household portfolio models, see Miniaci and
Weber (2001).
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4.2 Demand for Risky Assets in France
4.2.1 Direct stockholding
Demand for risky assets, A, is firstly proxied by direct stockholding invest-
ments. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5a report two-step estimation results
(discrete and continuous choice) using this definition of risky assets. The age
variables indicate that the probability of risky assets ownership is the lowest
for young households and increases through the life cycle to reach a maxi-
mum at the age of 46: increases in probability of owning risky assets could be
explained by information costs but the reduction in risky investments after
46 is more complex to interpret29.
The eﬀect of financial and total net wealth in the Probit model (and the
eﬀect of inheritance) is positive and is consistent with the presence of fixed
transaction costs and a DARA utility function. An increase in the amount
of financial net wealth from the 10th percentile (around 1,000 euros) to the
90th percentile (around 100,000 euros) increases the probability of being a
stockholder by 17.1 percentage points, when holding the other variables in
the regression constant at their means. The stock of information inherited
from parents proxied by the ownership of the same assets in parents’ wealth
increases also the probability of risky assets ownership (see also the positive
eﬀect of the head of household’s education, significant at 10%). Households
whose parents owned stocks are about 10.6 percentage points more likely to
hold stocks directly, again keeping the other regression variables constant at
their means. Self-employed own less equities than other households. Single
persons (except divorced), married couples or unmarried couples for less than
5 years invest more often in risky assets than other types of households.
The eﬀect of individual measures of risk aversion has the expected sign
in Probit but coeﬃcients only distinguish great risk averters (CRRA= 3.76)
from other risk averse households30. Households who are classified in the
group of high risk averters were, ceteris paribus, about 6.7 percentage points
less likely to hold stocks directly (relatively to the group of low risk averters).
The coeﬃcient of the proxy for liquidity constraints is negative in the Probit
equation: households who anticipate to be liquidity constrained in the future
29Arrondel and Masson (1990) suggest that the decrease in the probability of owning
risky assets could be interpreted by deferred consumption needs (a life cycle motivation): to
consume their wealth during retirement, old households prefer to hold liquid investments.
30However, the negative relation between risk aversion and demand for risky assets is
better estimated in the Tobit regression (column 3) than in the Probit regression.
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invest less in risky assets. Moving a household from the 10th to the 90th
percentile of probability to be deterred from applying for credit in the future
decreases the probability of being a stockholder by 7.6 percentage points,
keeping the all other regressors fixed at their means.
Concerning human resources, we first note a positive mean-eﬀect of non
financial income on the probability of stock market participation. Moving a
household from the 10th to the 90th percentile of labor income increases the
probability of being a stockholder by 9.4 percentage points, keeping the all
other regressors fixed at their means.
The coeﬃcient of the expected variance of income31 in the Probit equation
is negative and significantly diﬀerent from zero: households whose future
income is less risky are also those who invest less in risky assets. In other
words, income risk and endogenous risk do not appear to be substitutes.
Households who have no risk on their labor income were, ceteris paribus,
about 3.6 percentage points less likely to hold stocks directly than households
who are in the highest risky income decile.
There are few variables which are statistically significant in the condi-
tional asset demand equation (column 2): large Stock Exchange gains in the
past increase the amount invested in equities; entrust of financial advisors
for managing portfolio increases the share of stocks in financial wealth. So,
it appears that conditional demands for stocks are mainly explained by the
variables which proxy price fluctuations on the capital market. We find a
negative eﬀect of income risk on conditional demands for risky assets but the
coeﬃcient is not significantly diﬀerent from 0.32
To compare our results with Guiso et al. (1996) conclusions favoring the
substitutability hypothesis (the coeﬃcient of the expected variance of income
is significantly negative), we run a Tobit model on the share of risky assets
in financial wealth (column 3): the coeﬃcient of income variance is always
positive but it is only significant at 13% level.
Because retired people have no risk on their non financial income, we
31The value of subjective income variance introduced in the regressions corresponds to a
upper and a lower bound of 50% for the evolution of income. However, the results obtained
are qualitatively the same with other future values.
32These results, combined with the previous ones concerning stock market participation
seem to confirm, at least in part, the model of King and Leape (1998), where transaction
costs are one of the main explanatory factors of portfolio incompleteness. In this model,
assets demands, conditional upon ownership, depend mainly on technical characteristics
of assets and on individuals’ degree of risk aversion.
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perform the same regression as the previous ones but only on the sample
of households with an active head (Table 5b). The non financial income
volatility eﬀect is always negative on the probability of stock participation.
It is negative in the Tobit model for the share invested in stocks. Active
households who have no risk on their labor income were, ceteris paribus,
about 5.2 percentage points less likely to hold stocks directly than active
households who are in the highest risky income decile.
4.2.2 Robustness and miscellaneous results
Since only a small fraction of households report positive amounts of risky
assets, we have also explored the sensitivity of the results to a broader defini-
tion of risky assets: direct or indirect stockholding (Table 6a for total sample,
Table 6b for an active head of household). For most variables, the estimates
are similar to those obtained with the narrow definition. Notably, the coeﬃ-
cient of income variance in the discrete choice hypothesis is always positive
and statistically significant33; in the continuous choice, this coeﬃcient is not
significantly diﬀerent from 0. In Tobit regressions, the coeﬃcient is positive
and significantly diﬀerent from 0.
However, the previous estimates can be misleading (Lusardi, 1997). Some
of the zero values in the self-reported measure of earnings variance may be
artificial and may constitute a non negligible component of measurement
error. Additionally, there could be an endogeneity bias, since more risk
averse households might have chosen simultaneously safer jobs and less risky
33Households who have no risk on their labor income were, ceteris paribus, about 6
percentage points less likely to hold stocks directly and indirectly than households who
are in the highest risky income decile. A similar calculus on the sample of active households
leads to an increase of 7 percentage points.
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portfolios34. In these cases, the coeﬃcient of earnings variance is biased35.
We rigorously tested endogeneity by estimating an instrumental variables
model in which the first stage regression predicts income risk using an OLS
model, and the main equation predicts the probability of stock ownership
using a linear probability model, or the share of stock in financial wealth
using an OLS model. At the level of the household’s head, the instruments
are the subjective probability of unemployment, the existence of previous
health problems and a dummy for becoming independent; at the level of par-
ents, they are proxies for resources, social status and portfolio composition.
The results of specification tests concerning this econometric procedure are
reported in Table 7.
We tested whether income risk is endogenous by including in the main
equations both actual income risk and the error term from the first stage re-
gression (see Robin, 2000). In the case of the probability of stockholding, the
null hypothesis of exogeneity was not rejected. Therefore, the single equation
models is preferred as long as the instruments are valid. The instruments are
jointly statistically significant in the first regression (partial F-statistics were
2.045). Moreover, we did not reject the null hypothesis that the instruments
can be excluded from the main equations. For the conditional risky assets
demands, the conclusions are the same. In consequence, we can consider
that the positive eﬀect of income risk on risky assets portfolio is empirically
34Drèze and Modigliani (1966) claimed that individuals choose endogenously their job
also as a function of their risk preferences, given that they addressed a lifetime decision
theoretic model. Since the choice of a job is endogenous and future wages are uncertain, we
can interpret job choice as the investment in a risky asset, the return on which are future
uncertain wages. Eeckhoudt and Gollier (2002) have recently studied this problem. If u(.)
shows DARA, DAP and P>2A then a household who chooses simultaneously his job and
portfolio will be less exposed to portfolio risk than a household whose job is exogenous.
The intuition of this result is clear: for the individual characterized by these preferences,
both income and portfolio risks are substitutes in the sense that a risk averse individual
who chooses simultaneously his portfolio risk and his occupation depending on his attitude
towards risk will behave more conservatively than he otherwise would, had been his labour
income completely diversifiable.
35For instance, Friedman (1957, p. 74-75) found some self-employed save less than other
occupations. More recently, Skinner (1988) finds that the saving rate of the self-employed
and sales workers (those generally thought to receive riskier incomes) are less than the
others. As he did not control with a measure of risk aversion, he points out that ”there
may be problems... in diﬀerences of attitudes towards risk among occupations”. Guiso
and Paiella (2000) show a negative correlation between their empirical measure of risk
aversion and the probability of being self -employed.
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robust.36
5 Conclusion
In this work we have tried to clarify the empirical lack of consensus on the
cross-country diﬀerent attempts to test risk substitution by means of an ex-
tension of the static portfolio choice model with a partially correlated small
background risk. We argued that a non-zero correlation, even if small, can
counterbalance the theoretical prediction of risk substitution behaviour. For
the case of a negative correlation, we have shown that it might be perfectly
rational to increase individual exposure to financial risk in response to in-
creased earnings uncertainty. Risk substitution is always present but the
’hedging eﬀect’ dominates the risk substitution eﬀect. Conversely, if the cor-
relation is positive, risk substitution can be derived under less restrictive
assumptions.
In any case, the purpose of the theoretical part was to show that the em-
pirical analysis performed subsequently for the case of France is not at odds
with results available for other countries (substitutability in Italy and US.,
no correlation in Netherlands), once aggregate correlations are considered
and not necessarily controlled for. So, the strikingly diﬀerent conclusions
can be reconciled. Not being available an empirically satisfactory measure of
aggregate correlation between the empirical measures for earnings and excess
financial return risks, definite conclusions on the empirical relevance of risk
substitution theory should be postponed until then.37
However, other possible explanations can account for the empirically de-
tected eﬀect, like the role of labor supply flexibility, the endogeneity of job
choice, the strength of the welfare state benefits etc.
36If we consider that portfolio choice is made simultaneously to consumption choice,
wealth has to be consider also as an endogenous variable in the model. We have verified
that taking account of the endogeneity of this variable do not invalidate the positive
relation between risky assets demand and income risk.
37The paper of Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) is a good example of an empirical study which
introduces simultaneously in the regressions income risk and a measure of correlation of
nonfinancial income with the stock market. She uses PSID data and financial markets
return data, to conclude that correlations are not empirically significant to explain non-
participation nor conditional portfolio demands in the US.
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Appendix
Intuition of Proposition 1.
To better grasp the intuition, we will proceed in two steps. In the first
we will assume that the background risk is perfectly correlated with the
endogenous risk, and we will interpret the optimal portfolio response to its
introduction. The second step corresponds to the proof of Proposition 1.
The interpretation of the results in that proposition is made in accordance
with the results of step one.
Consider the truncated problem that obtains when the uncorrelated risk
component eh is absent. This preliminary step can be interpreted as impos-
ing an exogenous restriction on the amount of total wealth that must be
invested/shorted in the financial market providing an excess return over the
riskless asset of βez. Then the individual will adjust his initial risky position in
the absence of this constraint, to counterbalance the eﬀect of this restriction.
The program would be:
θ ∈ arg max
θ
Eu[w + θez]
The first order necessary and suﬃcient condition becomes :
Ez{ezu0[w + θez]} = Ez{ezu0[w + αez + βez]} = 0 (9)
If it is evaluated at the solution of [1] we can observe that by continuity
of u(.), the sign of the expression is related with the sign of the correlation
β :
signEz{ezu0[w + α∗ez + βez]} = −(signβ)
To see why, observe that for a small correlation β and/or a small risk ez,
we can approximate the marginal utility component in [ 9] as :
u0[w + α∗z + βz] ≈ u0[w + α∗z] + (βz)u00[w + α∗z],∀z
Premultiplying by z on both sides and taking expectations, we can observe
that the first term on the RHS coincides with the optimality condition of
problem [1], so that it is null. The second term on the RHS coincides with
the SOC of [1] times the correlation factor, and by concavity of u(.) will
always be negative if the correlation is positive, and conversely :
Ez{ezu0[w + α∗ez + βez]} ≈ βEz{[ez]2 u00[w + α∗ez]}
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So that we can conclude that :
β < 0 =⇒ Ez{ezu0[w + α∗ez + βez]} > 0 =⇒ bα > α∗
β ≥ 0 =⇒ Ez{ezu0[w + α∗ez + βez]} ≤ 0 =⇒ bα ≤ α∗
This shows that just considering the correlated part of background riskey there will be a direct eﬀect on the optimal portfolio composition α∗ that
will depend on the sign of the correlation. Intuitively, this component cor-
responds to a ’hedging eﬀect’ if the correlation is negative, or to a ’portfolio
composition constraint’ if the correlation is positive.
The Measure of Relative Risk Aversion
Suppose that you have a job which guarantees for life your household’s
current income R. Other companies oﬀer you various contracts which have
one chance out of two (50%) to provide you with a higher income and one
chance out of two (50%) to provide you with a lower income.
Are you prepared to accept Contract A which has 50% chances to double
your income R and 50% chances that your income will be reduced by one
third?
For those who answer YES : the Contract A is no longer available. You
are oﬀered Contract B instead which has 50% chances to double your income
R and 50% chances that it will be reduced by one half. Are you prepared to
accept?
For those who answer NO : you have refused Contract A. You are oﬀered
Contract C. which has 50% chances to double your income R and 50% chances
that it will be reduced by 20%. Are you prepared to accept?
The Measure of Earnings Uncertainty
Within the next 5 years, your total household revenue (the rise in prices
excluded) :
-... will have increased by more than 25%
-... will have increased by 10 to 25%
-... will have increased by less than 10%
-... will be constant
-... will have decreased by less than 10%
-... will have decreased by 10 to 25%
-... will have decreased by more than 25%
-... will have marked ups and downs (indicate the minimum andmaximum
annual income)
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You dispose of 100 points to be distributed among the 8 categories, ac-
cording to the degree to which you agree or you disagree with the relative
statement.
The Probability of Being Liquidity Constrained
In the ”Patrimoine 97” survey, households are asked two questions aimed
at measuring their ability to get access to the credit market. These questions
are similar to that of the SHIW Italian survey (Guiso et al. 1996). We
classify consumers as being liquidity constrained if they respond positively
to at least one of the two following questions. The first indicates whether a
consumer is a ”discouraging borrower”, the second whether he is a ”turned
down applicant”:
- Did you renounce to finance expenditures on durable goods (main res-
idence, cars ...) or did you renounce to restore your home because you ex-
pected that bank or other financial intermediaries will refuse the loan or the
mortgage?
- Did you renounce to finance expenditures on durable goods (main res-
idence, cars ...) or did you renounce to restore your home because bank or
other financial intermediaries refused the loan or the mortgage?
There are 11.7% of households who are liquidity constrained in the total
sample and 9.8% in the sample of respondents at the recto-verso question-
naire.
First we estimate the probability of being liquidity-constrained by con-
trolling for individuals’ characteristics. Then we use the predicted measure
as a proxy for the existence of future borrowing constraints in asset-demand
equations. The instruments for the borrowing constraints are the following:
global income, age, a dummy for retirement, occupation dummies, educa-
tion, household’s composition, parents’ social status and wealth, dummies
for unemployment (present and past), dummies for health problems (severe
or minor), and dummies for professional status and regional localization.
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Ownership (%) Amount (in FF) Amount (in Euro)
Direct Stockholding
Stocks 15,0                   25 044                3 818                 
Listed stocks 11,9                    20 252                 3 087                 
Unlisted stocks 1,4                      3 857                   588                    
Employers' stocks 3,1                      934                      142                    
Indirect stockholding -
Mutual funds (excluding money market funds) and 
other managed accounts
13,5                    18 900                 2 881                 
Source. Patrimoine 97 INSEE survey
Detail on survey questions
Table 1
Data on Direct and Indirect Stockholding
Table 2 : Sample characteristics
Average household's characteristics Respondents Total sample
Total net wealth (mean in French francs) 749 000 701 500
Financial wealth (mean in French francs) 245 000 220 000
Household income (mean in French francs) 156 750 152 800
Number holding risky assets (%) (direct stockholding) 20,5 15,0
Number holding risky assets (%) (direct or indirect stockholding) 30,0 23,1
Proportion of risky assets in financial wealth (mean) 0,19 0,21
Proportion of risky assets in financial wealth (mean) 0,27 0,28
Age of head (%)
least than 30 years old 11,5 11,8
30-40 years old 17,3 19,1
40-50 years old 18,8 20,3
50-60 years old 16,1 15,9
60-70 years old 15,3 13,4
more than 70 years old 21,1 19,5
Social status of head (%)
Farmer 4,6 5,1
Self employed (small production unit) 7,0 8,3
Self employed (big production unit) 0,2 0,4
Liberal profession 1,1 1,1
Executive 13,8 11,8
High qualified employee 21,8 18,8
Low qualified employee 20,0 19,4
High qualified workers 18,6 20,9
Low qualified workers 9,9 11,6
Inactive 2,8 2,7
Diploma of head (%)
No diploma 16,7 20,8
Primary level 33,4 33,7
Secondary level 14,7 14,5
Baccalaureate 14,2 13,0
Graduate studies 12,7 11,3
Postgraduate studies 8,3 6,7
Household composition (%)
Single 32,6 30,0
Couple without child 28,7 26,0
Couple with one child 12,0 13,3
Couple with two children 11,6 13,2
Couple with three children or more 5,3 6,9
Single with children 5,9 6,4
Other cases 3,8 4,2
Town resident (%) 56,1 59,5
Number of constrained households (%) 11,7 9,8
Relative risk aversion (CRRA)(3)(4)
3.76=<CRRA 41,3
2=<CRRA<3.76 40,2
1=<CRRA<2 11,9
CRRA<1 6,5
Coefficient of variation of earnings(4)(5) 4.32-4.94
Number of households 2 954 10 207
Source :  "Patrimoine 97" survey
(1) Direct stockholding : household hold equities directly.
(2) Direct or indirect stockholding : household hold equities directly or trough mutual funds.
(3) The measure of risk aversion is described in the appendix.
(4) For risk aversion and income variance, we assume that the variables of household can be proxied by the value estimated by the
respondent or, when there were two respondents in the household, the value evaluated by the head of the household (see the
appendix). 
(5) For the first value of income variance, we assume that the upper and the lower bound are 35%. For the second, we assume that
the upper and the lower bound are 50%.
Rejection of 
contract C
Acceptance of 
contract C
Rejection of 
contract B
3.76=<g 2=<g<3.76 1=<g<2
France (total 
sample)
43,1 39,4 11,2
France (>=50 
years old)
48,6 36,8 8,7
Netherlands (>= 
50 years old)
66,3 13,5 9,0
U.S.A. (>= 50 
years old)
64,6 11,6 10,9
Source : "Patrimoine 97" survey, Health and Retirement Survey (cf. Barsky & al. 1997), CentERpanel (cf. 
Kapteyn and Teppa, 2002)
5,9
12,8
Table 3 : Risk aversion in France, in Netherlands and in U.S.A.
Rejection of Contract A 
g<1
Acceptance of Contract A
Acceptance of 
contract B
6,3
11,2
s/y    (%) Frequency 1 Frequency 2 
0 41,0 41,0
0-2.5 6,1 6,1
2.5-5.0 13,4 12,7
4.0-7.5 17,0 14,9
7.5-10.0 9,7 5,9
10.0-15 7,6 11,7
more than 15 5,1 7,8
Mean : 4.32-4.94 100,0 100,0
Source : "Patrimoine 97" survey
(1) The lower and the upper bound are equal to 35%.
(2) The lower and the upper bound are equal to 50%.
Table 4 : Frequency Distribution of the Ratio of the Subjective 
Standard Deviation of Future Income to Current Earnings (s/y)
Table 5a
The demand for risky assets (direct stockholding)*
Variables
Est. (s.e.) Est. (s.e.) Est. (s.e.)
Financial wealth (10E-7) 9,863 (1,138) 3,773 (2,548) 1,969 (0,271)
Financial wealth squared (10E-14) -5,750 (0,900) -2,702 (1,742) -1,117 (0,221)
Total net wealth (10E-7) 0,977 (0,600) -0,647 (1,213) 0,263 (0,164)
Total net wealth squared (10E-14) -0,645 (0,489) 0,777 (0,782) -0,176 (0,121)
Income (log.) 0,214 (0,076) -0,098 (0,172) 0,050 (0,021)
Income risk (standard error of future income*10E-5) 0,501 (0,251) -0,425 (0,491) 0,105 (0,069)
Self-employed -0,284 (0,112) -0,279 (0,233) -0,063 (0,031)
Age(10E-1) 0,519 (0,169) -0,190 (0,369) 0,132 (0,048)
Age squared(10E-2) -0,056 (0,016) 0,021 (0,035) -0,014 (0,004)
Inheritance and gift received 0,206 (0,070) -0,104 (0,170) 0,050 (0,020)
Inter vivos  transfers -0,046 (0,087) 0,239 (0,192) 0,002 (0,025)
Diploma
Primary level 0,104 (0,124) 0,007 (0,035)
Secondary level 0,152 (0,142) 0,039 (0,040)
Baccalaureate 0,156 (0,142) 0,036 (0,040)
Graduate studies 0,178 (0,152) 0,042 (0,043)
Postgraduate studies 0,284 (0,159) 0,060 (0,044)
Marital Status
Married -0,162 (0,123) -0,281 (0,263) -0,045 (0,035)
Unmarried couple (>=5 years) -0,645 (0,213) -0,650 (0,546) -0,178 (0,061)
Unmarried couple (<5 years) -0,246 (0,189) 0,065 (0,445) -0,053 (0,054)
Widowed 0,064 (0,160) -0,347 (0,333) -0,001 (0,045)
Divorced -0,484 (0,181) -0,380 (0,461) -0,137 (0,052)
Number of children at home -0,027 (0,042) 0,168 (0,092) -0,001 (0,012)
Number of children away from home 0,058 (0,031) 0,051 (0,074) 0,016 (0,009)
Proxy for liquidity constraints -1,440 (0,604) -0,643 (1,643) -0,443 (0,172)
Urban resident 0,142 (0,069) 0,281 (0,161) 0,044 (0,020)
Parents own risky assets 0,371 (0,092) 0,089 (0,025)
Constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
No answer 0,259 (0,105) 0,365 (0,235) 0,068 (0,030)
2=<CRRA<3.76 0,218 (0,078) 0,305 (0,176) 0,066 (0,022)
1=<CRRA<2 0,163 (0,115) 0,348 (0,244) 0,058 (0,032)
CRRA<1 0,264 (0,146) 0,219 (0,311) 0,077 (0,042)
Gains at Stock exchange 1,527 (0,407)
Loose at Stock Exchange -0,720 (0,593)
Portfolio management
Manage portfolio individually 0,518 (0,180)
Follow their financial advisor 0,412 (0,186)
Financial advisor manager 1,058 (0,235)
No indication about managing 0,824 (0,277)
Constant -5,100 (0,898) -1,924 (2,673) -1,289 (0,253)
Inverse of Mill's ratio 0,601 (0,431)
Khi2(54) or Pseudo R2 
Number of observations
Source : "Patrimoine 97" survey
* Household's characteristics refer to the head except for income risk and relative risk aversion. For these two variables, we
assume that the variable of household can be proxied by the value estimated by the respondent or, when there were two
respondents in the household, the value evaluated by the head of the household. Reference groups are : no diploma, single,
CRRA>=3.76, no specific management.
416,52
(1) The dependant variable in demand equation (2) is the logistic transformation of the share (p) of risky assets in financial
wealth: log p/(1-p). In Tobit estimation (3), the dependant variable is the share of risky assets in financial wealth.
2 383 515 2 383
(2) The income risk variable is calculated with lower and upper bounds of 50% for future income evolution.
(3) Tobit estimates(1)(1) Probit estimates (2) Demand equation(1)
0,238
Table 5b
The demand for risky assets among active households (direct stockholding)*
Variables
Est. (s.e.) Est. (s.e.) Est. (s.e.)
Financial wealth (10E-7) 11,062 (1,519) 6,433 (3,697) 2,302 (0,388)
Financial wealth squared (10E-14) -6,030 (1,067) -3,732 (2,171) -1,142 (0,268)
Total net wealth (10E-7) 0,209 (0,704) -0,805 (1,590) 0,083 (0,204)
Total net wealth squared (10E-14) -0,317 (0,525) 0,573 (0,945) -0,129 (0,138)
Income (log.) 0,191 (0,092) -0,139 (0,222) 0,044 (0,026)
Income risk (standard error of future income*10E-5) 0,695 (0,275) -0,311 (0,612) 0,168 (0,080)
Self-employed -0,333 (0,138) -0,398 (0,313) -0,083 (0,040)
Age(10E-1) 0,820 (0,271) 0,031 (0,732) 0,202 (0,080)
Age squared(10E-2) -0,086 (0,030) 0,001 (0,082) -0,021 (0,009)
Inheritance and gift received 0,189 (0,084) -0,054 (0,219) 0,046 (0,025)
Inter vivos  transfers -0,241 (0,122) 0,414 (0,301) -0,041 (0,036)
Diploma
Primary level 0,226 (0,185) 0,024 (0,055)
Secondary level 0,257 (0,194) 0,059 (0,057)
Baccalaureate 0,322 (0,199) 0,053 (0,059)
Graduate studies 0,360 (0,202) 0,072 (0,059)
Postgraduate studies 0,487 (0,209) 0,096 (0,061)
Marital Status
Married -0,122 (0,138) -0,434 (0,320) -0,041 (0,041)
Unmarried couple (>=5 years) -0,575 (0,229) -0,938 (0,628) -0,162 (0,068)
Unmarried couple (<5 years) -0,233 (0,195) -0,009 (0,487) -0,052 (0,058)
Widowed 0,171 (0,232) -0,812 (0,529) 0,024 (0,070)
Divorced -0,531 (0,206) -1,080 (0,582) -0,164 (0,062)
Number of children at home -0,050 (0,047) 0,239 (0,109) -0,004 (0,014)
Number of children away from home 0,096 (0,053) 0,044 (0,135) 0,025 (0,016)
Proxy for liquidity constraints -1,234 (0,660) -2,166 (1,873) -0,410 (0,197)
Urban resident 0,128 (0,082) 0,303 (0,205) 0,034 (0,025)
Parents own risky assets 0,408 (0,106) 0,104 (0,031)
Constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
No answer 0,183 (0,138) 0,248 (0,328) 0,042 (0,042)
2=<CRRA<3.76 0,154 (0,093) 0,354 (0,223) 0,055 (0,028)
1=<CRRA<2 0,105 (0,132) 0,173 (0,301) 0,031 (0,039)
CRRA<1 0,133 (0,174) 0,035 (0,396) 0,022 (0,052)
Gains at Stock exchange 1,218 (0,632)
Loose at Stock Exchange -1,153 (0,802)
Portfolio management
Manage portfolio individually 0,645 (0,223)
Follow their financial advisor 0,653 (0,244)
Financial advisor manager 1,165 (0,310)
No indication about managing 0,808 (0,300)
Constant -5,590 (1,072) -2,603 (3,426) -1,395 (0,312)
Inverse of Mill's ratio 1,150 (0,515)
Khi2(54) or Pseudo R2 
Number of observations
Source : "Patrimoine 97" survey
(3) Tobit estimates(1)(1) Probit estimates (2) Demand equation(1)
0,209
* Household's characteristics refer to the head except for income risk and relative risk aversion. For these two variables, we assume
that the variable of household can be proxied by the value estimated by the respondent or, when there were two respondents in the
household, the value evaluated by the head of the household. Reference groups are : no diploma, single, CRRA>=3.76, no specific
management.
272,37
(1) The dependant variable in demand equation (2) is the logistic transformation of the share (p) of risky assets in financial wealth:
log p/(1-p). In Tobit estimation (3), the dependant variable is the share of risky assets in financial wealth.
1 690 347 1 690
(2) The income risk variable is calculated with lower and upper bounds of 50% for future income evolution.
Table 6a
The demand for risky assets (direct or indirect stockholding)*
Variables
Est. (s.e.) Est. (s.e.) Est. (s.e.)
Financial wealth (10E-7) 11,898 (1,205) 2,393 (2,203) 2,205 (0,302)
Financial wealth squared (10E-14) -6,552 (0,901) -2,089 (1,580) -1,275 (0,251)
Total net wealth (10E-7) 1,459 (0,579) -0,276 (1,090) 0,377 (0,178)
Total net wealth squared (10E-14) -1,104 (0,463) 0,774 (0,764) -0,249 (0,136)
Income (log.) 0,240 (0,069) -0,108 (0,156) 0,063 (0,022)
Income risk (standard error of future income*10E-5) 0,694 (0,247) -0,015 (0,444) 0,168 (0,075)
Self-employed -0,382 (0,107) -0,552 (0,212) -0,097 (0,034)
Age(10E-1) 0,381 (0,153) 0,160 (0,324) 0,149 (0,049)
Age squared(10E-2) -0,045 (0,014) -0,013 (0,031) -0,016 (0,005)
Inheritance and gift received 0,213 (0,066) -0,147 (0,147) 0,059 (0,021)
Inter vivos  transfers 0,106 (0,081) -0,140 (0,175) 0,026 (0,026)
Diploma
Primary level 0,021 (0,112) -0,011 (0,037)
Secondary level 0,244 (0,127) 0,108 (0,041)
Baccalaureate 0,186 (0,129) 0,061 (0,042)
Graduate studies 0,130 (0,139) 0,065 (0,045)
Postgraduate studies 0,184 (0,148) 0,065 (0,047)
Marital Status
Married -0,205 (0,113) 0,298 (0,227) -0,024 (0,036)
Unmarried couple (>=5 years) -0,518 (0,183) 0,197 (0,423) -0,122 (0,060)
Unmarried couple (<5 years) -0,238 (0,169) -0,082 (0,375) -0,055 (0,056)
Widowed 0,023 (0,149) -0,057 (0,298) 0,015 (0,048)
Divorced -0,407 (0,160) 0,486 (0,365) -0,089 (0,052)
Number of children at home -0,040 (0,038) -0,002 (0,081) -0,014 (0,012)
Number of children away from home 0,023 (0,030) 0,101 (0,066) 0,012 (0,010)
Proxy for liquidity constraints -1,919 (0,544) 0,821 (1,553) -0,633 (0,179)
Urban resident 0,076 (0,064) 0,305 (0,132) 0,040 (0,021)
Parents own risky assets 0,250 (0,088) 0,070 (0,028)
Constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
No answer 0,211 (0,097) 0,253 (0,204) 0,064 (0,031)
2=<CRRA<3.76 0,164 (0,072) 0,161 (0,151) 0,055 (0,023)
1=<CRRA<2 0,010 (0,109) 0,361 (0,217) 0,025 (0,035)
CRRA<1 0,157 (0,139) 0,270 (0,270) 0,076 (0,044)
Gains at Stock exchange 1,008 (0,388)
Loose at Stock Exchange -0,152 (0,533)
Portfolio management
Manage portfolio individually 0,454 (0,176)
Follow their financial advisor 0,383 (0,170)
Financial advisor manager 0,871 (0,213)
No indication about managing 0,520 (0,196)
Constant -4,537 (0,810) -1,840 (2,316) -1,396 (0,263)
Inverse of Mill's ratio 0,203 (0,396)
Khi2(54) or Pseudo R2 
Number of observations
Source : "Patrimoine 97" survey
(3) Tobit estimates(1)(1) Probit estimates (2) Demand equation(1)
0,211
* Household's characteristics refer to the head except for income risk and relative risk aversion. For these two variables, we assume
that the variable of household can be proxied by the value estimated by the respondent or, when there were two respondents in the 
household, the value evaluated by the head of the household. Reference groups are : no diploma, single, CRRA>=3.76, no specific
management.
494,43
(1) The dependant variable in demand equation (2) is the logistic transformation of the share (p) of risky assets in financial wealth:
log p/(1-p). In Tobit estimation (3), the dependant variable is the share of risky assets in financial wealth.
2 383 749 2 383
(2) The income risk variable is calculated with lower and upper bounds of 50% for future income evolution.
Table 6b
The demand for risky assets among active households (direct or indirect stockholding)*
Variables
Est. (s.e.) Est. (s.e.) Est. (s.e.)
Financial wealth (10E-7) 10,598 (1,498) 2,455 (3,047) 2,155 (0,421)
Financial wealth squared (10E-14) -5,816 (1,036) -1,844 (1,864) -1,132 (0,296)
Total net wealth (10E-7) 1,202 (0,673) -0,389 (1,318) 0,325 (0,216)
Total net wealth squared (10E-14) -0,905 (0,493) 0,699 (0,860) -0,213 (0,151)
Income (log.) 0,193 (0,082) -0,160 (0,191) 0,054 (0,027)
Income risk (standard error of future income*10E-5) 0,693 (0,266) 0,048 (0,512) 0,197 (0,085)
Self-employed -0,527 (0,131) -0,682 (0,287) -0,169 (0,043)
Age(10E-1) 1,028 (0,248) -0,379 (0,644) 0,299 (0,083)
Age squared(10E-2) -0,115 (0,028) 0,052 (0,073) -0,032 (0,009)
Inheritance and gift received 0,177 (0,078) -0,140 (0,174) 0,044 (0,026)
Inter vivos  transfers -0,145 (0,113) -0,089 (0,239) -0,042 (0,037)
Diploma
Primary level -0,021 (0,157) -0,033 (0,054)
Secondary level 0,222 (0,163) 0,105 (0,056)
Baccalaureate 0,173 (0,171) 0,038 (0,058)
Graduate studies 0,145 (0,174) 0,054 (0,059)
Postgraduate studies 0,261 (0,183) 0,072 (0,061)
Marital Status
Married -0,108 (0,127) 0,311 (0,259) 0,002 (0,042)
Unmarried couple (>=5 years) -0,352 (0,195) 0,140 (0,449) -0,077 (0,066)
Unmarried couple (<5 years) -0,171 (0,175) -0,104 (0,387) -0,039 (0,060)
Widowed 0,274 (0,217) -0,383 (0,441) 0,079 (0,073)
Divorced -0,339 (0,177) 0,308 (0,414) -0,073 (0,060)
Number of children at home -0,082 (0,042) 0,066 (0,091) -0,024 (0,014)
Number of children away from home 0,065 (0,049) 0,147 (0,110) 0,028 (0,016)
Proxy for liquidity constraints -2,195 (0,593) -0,021 (1,809) -0,700 (0,202)
Urban resident 0,114 (0,075) 0,381 (0,164) 0,049 (0,026)
Parents own risky assets 0,310 (0,100) 0,090 (0,033)
Constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
No answer 0,267 (0,124) 0,140 (0,273) 0,084 (0,042)
2=<CRRA<3.76 0,163 (0,085) 0,171 (0,185) 0,061 (0,029)
1=<CRRA<2 -0,008 (0,123) 0,218 (0,252) 0,010 (0,041)
CRRA<1 0,169 (0,161) -0,041 (0,318) 0,050 (0,053)
Gains at Stock exchange 0,784 (0,566)
Loose at Stock Exchange -0,280 (0,679)
Portfolio management
Manage portfolio individually 0,561 (0,213)
Follow their financial advisor 0,449 (0,219)
Financial advisor manager 0,893 (0,277)
No indication about managing 0,564 (0,209)
Constant -5,303 (0,958) -0,373 (3,127) -1,610 (0,320)
Inverse of Mill's ratio 0,388 (0,528)
Khi2(54) or Pseudo R2 
Number of observations
Source : "Patrimoine 97" survey
* Household's characteristics refer to the head except for income risk and relative risk aversion. For these two variables, we assume
that the variable of household can be proxied by the value estimated by the respondent or, when there were two respondents in the
household, the value evaluated by the head of the household. Reference groups are : no diploma, single, CRRA>=3.76, no specific
management.
332,71
(1) The dependant variable in demand equation (2) is the logistic transformation of the share (p) of risky assets in financial wealth:
log p/(1-p). In Tobit estimation (3), the dependant variable is the share of risky assets in financial wealth.
1 690 522 1 690
(2) The income risk variable is calculated with lower and upper bounds of 50% for future income evolution.
(3) Tobit estimates(1)(1) Probit estimates (2) Demand equation(1)
0,192
Table 7 : Specification tests
Test  Test Statistic p-value  Conclusion
Instruments correlated with endogenous variable F (21,2382)=2,045 0,003 Good instruments
Probability of direct stockholding ownership 1
Endogeneity c2(1)= 0,019 0,892 Not endogenous
Validity of instruments F (21,2382)=0,686 0,851 Good instruments
Probability of direct or indirect  stockholding ownership 1
Endogeneity c2(1)= 0,034 0,853 Not endogenous
Validity of instruments F (21,2382)=0,542 0,954 Good instruments
Share of direct stockholding in financial wealth 2
Endogeneity c2(1)= 2,167 0,141 Not endogenous
Validity of instruments F (21,2382)=0,575 0,937 Good instruments
Share of direct or indirect stockholding in financial wealth 2
Endogeneity c2(1)= 0,828 0,360 Not endogenous
Validity of instruments F (21,2382)=0,661 0,874 Good instruments
Source : "Patrimoine 97" survey
Notes : 
1) The probability is estimated with a linear probability model.
2) The model is estimated with OLS.
